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Introduction; Chinese History
in Economic Perspective
Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li

Economics and economists tend to bring out strong emotions both in the
general public and among (noneconomist) scholars. How often does one en
counter the sentiment, “If economists are so smart, how come they couldn’t
predict such-and-such [the latest round of inflation, the October ’87 stock
market crash, etc.]?” Economics has always been a controversial field of
study, and economists often exhibit a strong professional affinity for conten
tiousness among themselves. Yet, while society might conceivably get along
without economists, it would be difficult to imagine a world in which eco
nomics did not play a role, even the mythical world of Robinson Crusoe.
Nor can historians avoid the economic aspects of history even when they
would like to do so. Embedded in all their common notions of how history
has developed are views, conscious or unconscious, of economic forces; the
prosperity of the Italian city-states prompted the cultural efflorescence of the
Renaissance, the Chinese had a rural revolution because the peasants were
so poor, Europeans conducted oceanic explorations because they needed
spices, and so forth. But fundamentally, historians need to know about the
material side of history because they are concerned with human welfare,
social development, and national histories. The classic definition of eco
nomics, after all, is that it studies the allocation of scarce resources among
alternative uses. Therefore, subjects such as agriculture, money, industry,
and trade compel historians’ interest for a variety of commendable reasons.
It is our contention, however, that the study of such subjects in economic
history has not always employed a true economic approach or perspective, at
least among historians of China. This book is dedicated to the idea that the
history of China’s economy has been written many times in many ways but
that the economic history of China has not yet been written. This, indeed, is
not such a history either, but the essays in this volume are intended to illus1
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trate how economic history is not the same as the history of an economy, and
how an economic perspective involves more than an interest in some eco
nomic topic. Scholarship on China has excelled in studying the economy of
China, but has barely begun to do so with a true economic perspective. The
fundamental objective of this volume is to delineate and illustrate the poten
tial contribution of systematically applying an economic approach to the
study of China’s economic history.
STATE OF THE FIELD

Traditional Chinese scholarship did not neglect economic topics. Indeed, in
the standard dynastic histories, sections on population, land taxes, and
money, for example, assumed a prominent position. Local histories also
treated these topics, as well as listing or describing local products, grain
storage, and the like. A well-functioning economy was the hallmark of a suc
cessful dynastic regime, a visible sign of the harmony of heaven, earth, and
man. Economics and morality were linked; a prosperous economy was a sign
of the essential morality of the ruler. The model of the economy, like that of
society, was based on the notions of harmony and stability, and not on the
desirability of growth and change. The golden age of the past was one in
which men plowed the fields and women wove cloth. Wars and famines sig
nified the disruption of stability. The goal was to restore the status quo ante,
the golden age, not to surpass it, because it could not be surpassed.
In recent decades, a difierent paradigm, that of Chinese Marxism, has
dominated Chinese scholarship. The three broad areas that receive the most
attention from historians in the People’s Republic of China are land tenure,
foreign imperialism, and the “sprouts of capitalism.” In the post-Mao era,
the “Asiatic mode of production” was added to this list. Studies of land
tenure are closely linked to issues of servitude and subordination among
China s peasantry in each period of history. Studies of foreign imperialism
stress the plundering of China’s economic resources by Western powers
and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the obstacles to
the development of a modern economy posed by the unequal treaties.
Studies of the sprouts of capitalism” focus on the signs of development
in China s late imperial, or early modern, economy (roughly since the mid
sixteenth century), such as the expansion of handicraft production and the
freeing of labor in the countryside, but the line of interpretation has shifted
from time to time—sometimes emphasizing the sprouts themselves and, at
other times, the smothering of the sprouts. The revival of interest in Marx’s
idea of the Asiatic mode of production highlighted the dilemma of Chinese
Marxist historians: how to fit Chinese history into the scheme of world his
tory. Previously discredited by party historians because it tended to suggest
that Chinese development did not fit into a unilinear world pattern, the Asi
atic mode attracted renewed attention in the 1980s in part because it helped
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legitimize China’s recent economic policies, which may seem to transgress
the stages of history normally posited in the Marxist scheme of history.
How one evaluates the Marxist scholarship on China is to a certain extent
a function of one’s ideological persuasion. Certainly the Marxist framework
provides a compelling agenda for research. Critics think, and sometimes dare
to say, that the agenda is limited and that the questions posed to some extent
determine the outcome. But this criticism could be leveled at any paradigm
or framework. What is striking to us, however, is the extent to which a mate
rialist or economic interpretation of history has essentially transformed itself
into social history. It is the struggle between social forces and the conflict o
social classes that seem to determine the economic stage of history rather
than the economic forces that determine the social. Marxist historiography
has stood Marxism on its head.
., . .
Substituting modernization theory for Confucian or Marxist theory, the
postwar generation of Western historians has also sought reasons for China s
economic backwardness in modern times. American scholarship m the 1950s
and 1960s tended to focus on treaty-port developments and the introduction
of Western trade and technology into China, implying that contact with the
West, even on unfavorable terms, offered an opportunity for positive change
that was missed.* A second wave of scholarship has focused on the role ot
entrepreneurship and bureaucratic leadership (or the lack of it) m
nine
teenth and twentieth centuries, finding in them a major reason for China s
“failure to modernize” along Western lines, even when exposed to Western
influence.2
a similar vein, scholarship in Taiwan has emphasized the in
stitutional and bureaucratic aspects of China’s economic development m the
last two centuries.
».r i n • ^
In an innovative and influential interpretive history, Mark Elvin tried to
break away from the yoke of Western periodization schemes to show that
China’s history followed a different “pattern,” in which a medieval economic
revolution led to a “high-level equilibrium trap” that did not prevent further
growth, but did impede significant change—“economic development with
out technological change.’’^ Yet like other Western scholars, and indeed
like the Chinese scholars, his underlying preoccupation is with explaining
China’s poor economic performance in modern times.
, , , .
j
Like Elvin, recent Western scholarship has tended to search back beyon
1. E.g., Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840 1937 (CamE^^^Alben Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1862-1874) and
Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); Yen-p’ing Hao, The Comprador in
China: Bridge between East and West (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Wellington K. K Ciinrs, Merchants,
Mandarins, and Modem Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China (C-n'bridge, Mass W77); and Sherm^
Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge,

Mark Lvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, 1973), Part Three, pp. 203-319.
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the troubled modern period to find strengths and weaknesses in the Chinese
economy before the nineteenth century that might help to explain its be
havior after the Opium War. These studies have focused on the role of the
traditional Chinese state in shaping the economy, particularly in the eigh
teenth century. Building on Ping-ti Ho’s work on China’s population,'^ these
studies have, on the one hand, emphasized the positive role of the state in
encouraging the settlement of undeveloped and frontier areas^ and in main
taining granary stocks to stabilize prices and prevent famines® while, on the
other hand, stressing the essential limitations of state power. Yeh-chien
Wang’s work on Qing land tax, Madeleine Zelin’s work on tax surcharges,
and Susan Mann’s work on the merchants’ role in collecting commercial
taxes all tend to show how the Qing and Republican governments were un
able, and sometimes unwilling, to capture a larger share of the country’s
wealth for their own purposes.^
Some American scholarship, as well as some Japanese scholarship, has
shared the Chinese interest in the primacy of social forces in governing eco
nomic history. For example, standing on different sides of an ideological di
vide, Ramon H. Myers and Philip C. C. Huang have disagreed sharply on
the extent to which the land tenure system in North China produced social
inequalities.® The work of William T. Rowe and others on the growth of
Chinese cities tends to emphasize the strength of commercial developments
that took place largely outside the sphere of direct government influence.®
And G. William Skinner’s influential work on marketing and his macro
regions paradigm both stress the essential independence of economic activity
from political trends as embodied in the dynastic cycle.'®
Although there are notable exceptions not captured in this broad sum
mary, it is striking how American scholarship on Chinese economic history,
4. Ho, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
5. E.g., Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1987).
6. Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucratie et famine en Chine au 18e siecle (Paris, 1980), and PierreEtienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China,
1650-1850 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1991).
7. Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973);
Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century ChHng
China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984); and Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureau
cracy, 1750-1850 (Stanford, 1987).
8. Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung,
1890-1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970) and Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social
Change in North China (Stanford, 1985).
9. William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford,
1984).
10. See especially “Introduction: Urban Development in Imperial China” and “Regional
Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China,” both in G. William Skinner, ed.. The City in Late
Imperial China (Stanford, 1977).
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somewhat like PRC scholarship, has really revolved around social and insti
tutional history. In fact, the bulk of the work concerning the Chinese econ
omy has been done, not by those trained in economics, but rather by social
historians, anthropologists, and others. Most of these scholars—including
some of the contributors to this volume—have not in the past made regular
and systematic use of economic analysis to inform and structure their in
quiries. In part this may be due to ideological or disciplinary predisposition,
and in part it may reflect the types of sources available for the study of eco
nomic history. Traditional official records are strong on bureaucratic institu
tions and practices but weak in quantitative material. Even so, the tendency
for researchers to neglect economic approaches in writing the history of
China’s economy may reflect their limited appreciation of how the eco
nomic perspective can sharpen an analysis of the historical record.
In the 1960s similar criticisms were raised by a group of “new economic
historians” against the work of the earlier generation of eeonomic historians
in the West. Feeling that the traditional economic histories of Europe and the
United States overemphasized the description of legal and other institutions,
the new generation advocated the application of economic theory and quan
titative methods to historical scholarship. With the advent of Robert Fogel
and Stanley Engerman’s study of slavery in the American South, and the en
suing controversies, the Cliometric revolution reached its heyday and, some
have said, began to peak." Nonetheless, a more quantitative and analytic
approach continues to prevail in the leading journals of economic history.
Our goal is not to champion the introduction of Cliometrics into Chinese
economic history but rather to advocate adopting a more self-conscious eco
nomic perspective that may or may not involve quantitative analysis. Our
belief is that the use of economic theory can illuminate issues that might
otherwise prove inaccessible. In addition, the contributors to this volume
have reached the surprising conclusion that applying economic analysis to
historical topics often enlarges the interpretive significance of phenomena
that historians, and not economists, are best qualified to comprehend.
ECONOMIC THEORY

What do we mean by an economic perspective? We mean the application of
economic theory and methods to the study of historical topics.
Classical economic theory, as developed in the West, rests on a number of
key concepts, whieh some call principles and others may call assumptions.
The most fundamental of these is the eoncept of choice. Donald N. McCloskey
11. Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro
Slavery (Boston, 1974). The development of the new economic history is discussed in Alexander
J. Field, ed., The Future of Economic History (Boston, 1987), in the editor’s introductory essay.
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defines economics as “the study of human choice under constraints.”In
come and wealth, the conventional measures of economic well-being, define
the extent of choice available to consumers. In most economies, choice is
exercised primarily in markets, which offer opportunities to sell commodities
and human skills in return for income, which can be translated, again
through the marketplace, into consumption goods. Prices signal the rates at
which any individual’s resources of money, time, and skill can be converted
into desired commodities or services. For the economist, prices demand
attention because they offer precise measures of both choice and constraint
that (important for the historian) are often recorded in great detail. Markets
and prices thus emerge from the centrality of choice as natural focal points
for historical inquiry.
Rationality is a closely related concept. Rationality means that people are
motivated by self-interest, primarily pecuniary. Economic rationality means
that individuals, families, and organizations have well-defined ideas about
how various opportunities affect their well-being and that choice rests upon
comparison of the cost of available alternatives. Economic rationality sug
gests that people know how to calculate costs and benefits and that they are
free to act according to their choices.
The centrality of choice in economics leads to the concept of opportunity
cost, which defines the cost of a specific action in terms of the value of alterna
tive options rather than actual monetary outlay. Or, in McCloskey’s words,
“choosing one thing means giving up another, because things are scarce,
constrained.”*® In the economists’ view, the cost of education, for example,
includes the value of income-earning opportunities forsaken by the student as
well as the actual tuition she or he pays. The opportunity cost of moving to a
new location must comprehend the value of wages lost while on the road as
well as transportation costs. Opportunity cost is quite literally the value of
“the road not taken.”
Much of economic analysis revolves around the concept of equilibrium,
which portrays economic circumstance as the outcome of a balance of con
flicting forces. Market price is determined through bidding, a process of
organized struggle between buyers, who seek to force the price to the lowest
possible level, and sellers, whose interest is served by attaining the highest
possible price. Market forces ceaselessly push price and quantity in the direc
tion of equilibrium. If demand exceeds supply at the current price, anxious
buyers will bid up the price, simultaneously curbing demand and attracting
additional supplies. If price is so high that supply exceeds demand, sellers’
prices will be bid down, leading toward the balance between desired pur
chases and sales that characterizes an equilibrium position.
12. McCloskey, “The Economics of Choice” (Unpublished paper prepared for the Workshop
on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu, January 1987), p. 1.
13. Ibid., 1.
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Together with the idea of entry and exit, which simply maintains that pro
ductive resources, including human labor, will abandon occupations offering
low rewards and gravitate toward the areas of greatest opportunity, the econ
omists’ equilibrium notion offers a valuable tool for historical researchers.
Even though the interaction of supply and demand in particular markets may
not leave clear tracks in the historical record, the qualitative consequences
of changes in equilibrium positions often generate shifts in the direction of
resource flows that will not escape the historian’s notice. As D. K. Lieu has
observed, businessmen in China (and elsewhere) “are ready to clear out at
any time” if they see better prospects in another trade. The appearance of
new businesses and the abandonment of old trades thus become a sensitive
barometer of relative profitability in different lines of endeavor.*^ Similarly, if
large numbers of workers migrate from North China to Manchuria, or from
the rust belt to California, no statistical analysis is required to verify the
existence of regional differences in economic opportunity.
OBJECTIONS TO ECONOMIC THEORY

When thus presented as a series of abstract concepts, economic theory often
provokes the deepest skepticism, if not outright hostility, among nonecono
mists.
Some have charged that these ideas of neoclassical Western economics
are not universal principles or absolute truths but are, instead, a series of
assumptions that are largely a matter of perspective or even faith, not sus
ceptible to proof or argument. Moreover, these ideas are culturally and his
torically specific, a product of a particular phase of Western history, and are
not universally applicable. Some, like Karl Polanyi, have argued that these
ideas themselves have shaped people’s behavior and the development of
economic institutions, especially markets, that they have been, in short, not
descriptive but prescriptive.*®
Others object to economic theory because they believe it to rest on a view
of human nature that is self-fulfilling, possibly erroneous, and certainly
repugnant. “Rational economic man as a reflection of human nature is a
fiction. . . . But it is a powerful fiction, and it becomes less and less a fiction
as more and more of our institutions get pervaded by its assumptions and
other paths are closed,” writes one recent critic.*® Adam Smith’s notion that
individuals pursuing their own self-interest are “led by an invisible hand”
toward improving the society and economy in which they live is difficult to
reconcile with more flattering views of human nature and human good.
14.
15.
16.
1986),

Lieu, The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai (Shanghai, 1936), p. 103.
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1957).
Barry Schwartz, The Battle for Human Nature: Science, Morality and Modem Life (New York,
p. 325.
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There are those who believe that the classical economists’ view of human
nature is not only incorrect but that it can be replaced by a superior form of
morality. Amitai Etzioni, for example, argues for the replacement of utili
tarianism with ethical principles that stress intention, not result, for the re
placement of individual calculation with collective rationality, and for the
replacement of economic rationality with values and emotions.*^
Most others who object to economic theory do so on the grounds that it is
empirically invalid. They say that simple observation will reveal that not
everyone is motivated by monetary self-interest above all other considera
tions and that the notion of economic rationality must therefore be false. The
economists reply that economic rationality need not imply ceaseless calcula
tion of cost and benefit by households and businesses, nor must economic
decisions rest exclusively on financial considerations. Although economists
often construct theories on the assumption that individuals and business
firms pursue maximum financial rewards, the notion of rationality encom
passes the possibility that a desire for prestige or perhaps stability, as well as
monetary gain, may motivate economic behavior. The recent debate about
the “moral economy of the peasant” highlights this controversy, with James
C. Scott arguing that in peasant societies the dominant motive is survival
and security, so that risk minimization, not profit maximization, is the prin
cipal goal.*® Economists respond that peasant rationality is essentially no
difierent from anyone else’s rationality and that avoidance of risk is not in
consistent with rational calculation.
Critics also protest that rational choice implies perfect information and
intelligence. But what if someone does not have all the information needed,
or what if he or she is stupid or, worse still, lazy? I could increase iny finan
cial resources if I thought about my investments all the time, but I do not
choose to use my time that way. The opportunity cost, measured in work or
recreational time lost, is simply too high. But economists reply that decisions
based on limited information and crude calculations may in fact reflect
rational behavior. After all, the time and expense required to collect further
information or to conduct detailed studies of opportunity costs may outweigh
the anticipated benefits of prolonged search and analysis.
Finally, skeptics reject the idea that people actually have a choice in eco
nomic matters and are free to enter into or exit from economic activities as
some kind of economists’ wonderland, full of Mad Hatters. Surely, in real life
people are not always free to change jobs, change residences, or change in
vestments according to the dictates of rational calculation.*® Custom, law,
17. Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dirrunsion: Toward a New Ecorwmics (New York, 1988).
18. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia
(New Haven, 1976).
19. The Nobel Prize-winning economist George J. Stigler tells the story of an economist who
carefully decided how far from the city to locate his country home by efficiently balancing the
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social practice and prejudice, inertia, and any number of restrictions on be
havior exist today and were even more decisive in premodern times.
Economists, however, recognize that market activity and price formation
do not occur in a social or cultural vacuum. They see the institutional
arrangements that circumscribe and encapsulate economic activity—the
household, legal structures, customary market procedures, forms of contract
arrangement, business organization, even ideology and morality—as con
straining economic activity along with limitations on the stock of physical
and financial resources.But economists regard institutions as flexible
rather than immutable. If costs exceed benefits, economists anticipate
change (perhaps gradual) in the relations between individuals and social
institutions, as well as between buyers and sellers. The post-World War II
increase in female employment in the United States represents such an event,
with the unorganized response of millions of women to altered labor market
conditions leading to changes in marriage practices, family size, child rear
ing, educational patterns, eating habits, and many other aspects of life long
regarded as determined by custom and tradition rather than the market
place.
The clash between economists and noneconomists is perhaps best em
bodied in the economists’ favorite term, ceteris paribus (literally, all other
things being equal). While economists will acknowledge the importance of
noneconomic factors, those bothersome factors are generally left in the back
ground of their theories and models. Let others study politics, law, social
class, injustice, and the like. Models can be pure and “elegant,” a favorite
expression of economists, because all those other factors can be held constant
or set aside. And since such factors are not easily quantifiable, how much
more convenient to leave them out. Quantification of the nonquantitative is
best left to the “soft” social scientists—the sociologists, the political scien
tists, and the historians.
It is ceteris paribus that allows economists to be optimists. Although eco
nomics is called the dismal science, in fact economists tend to maintain a rosy
view of the world controlled by an invisible hand. If only the government and
others would stay out of it, the rational response to opportunity could pro
duce growth and a better life for everyone. In the field of Chinese studies, the

number of fresh eggs he could get against the number of friends who would still be willing to visit
him. In his review of Stigler’s memoirs, Robert Krulwich dryly comments, “Here, I say, is why
more and more people ignore economists.” New York Times Book Review, Oct. 23, 1988.
20. Jon Cohen, “Institutions and Economic Analysis” (Unpublished paper prepared for the
Workshop on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu, January 1987).
21. In all fairness, it must be said that economists tend to recognize their professional weak
nesses and know how to laugh at them. Evidence for this can be found in the rich store of
economist jokes that end with the punch line, “Assume...”
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optimism of the economists stands in marked contrast to the gloomy prog
nostications of the political scientists. The Chinese economic reforms of the
1980s inspired great hope among most economists, who tended to see the
possibility for continued growth and change, while political scientists warned
of bureaucratic competition, political backlash, social discontent, and other
dangers, which they said might thwart the reforms.
THEORETICAL REASONING

The tendency of many economists to sweep noneconomic factors into the
dustbin of ceteris paribus is indeed regrettable. Recently, however, a few
economic theorists themselves have begun to question the basic assumptions
of the approaches that have dominated their field. The study of macroeco
nomics has been described as “a religious battlefield,” where the most
fundamental beliefs are being challenged.^^ George A. Akerlof, who has con
tributed to this battle, has said
The unwritten rules that only economic phenomena be considered in economic
models, with agents as individualistic, selfish maximizers, restrict the range of
economic theory and in some cases even cause the economics profession to
appear peculiarly absurd—because, without relaxation of these rules, certain
almost indisputable economic facts, such as the existence of involuntary unem
ployment, become inconsistent with economic theory. . . . Individualistic max
imizing behavior constitutes an assumption that sharply restricts the domain of
possible economic models. It is an assumption that turns out to be surprisingly
restrictive.^^

While recognizing the importance of noneconomic factors in governing
economic behavior, a theorist such as Akerlof is nevertheless concerned pri
marily with perfecting an economic model, albeit one that he considers
reasonably consistent with reality. For some economic theorists, it might be
said, the model is the reality. Many economists tend to value work that con
tributes to the building of economic theory and to dismiss the study of real
data as mere “empirical work.” Economic historians, however, have argued
for the importance of economic history to the development of theory.It is
our contention that just as economists need to test their theories against his
torical reality, historians can and should enrich their work through the use of
economic theory, as well as economic methods.
Economic theory can serve several purposes for historians. At a practical
22. An insight attributed to Mark Kuperberg of the Economics Department, Swarthmore
College, whom we also thank for the reference to Akerlof’s work (see n. 23).
23. George A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales: Essays That Entertain the Consequences
of New Assumptions in Economic Theoiy {Cambridge, I98i),p. 2.

24. The contributions that historical studies can make to economic theory are outlined in
essays in William M. Parker, ed.. Economic History and the Modem Economist (Oxford and New
York, 1986).
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level, some knowledge of economic theory can provide essential context for
interpreting evidence that would otherwise be misunderstood. Upon learning
of the small share of imported grain (and more generally, of foreign trade)
in the economic life of late Qing China, the historian (and even the
economist) naturally assumes that foreign trade must have played a small
role in China’s economy, especially in the interior. But this assumption over
looks the economists’ “marginal principle,” which teaches that market prices
are determined by the behavior of “marginal” buyers and sellers, who are on
the brink of indifference between patronizing the local market or doing busi
ness elsewhere. If the demand for and supply of a particular commodity is
“inelastic,” meaning the amount people will purchase or sell is relatively
inflexible in the face of changes in market price (as in the case of heating oil,
milk, or insulin), then small changes in quantity may lead to relatively large
changes in the price. Alternatively, if the demand for a commodity is elastic,
small changes in price may lead to relatively large changes in the quantities
people desire to buy or sell. Thus shifts in the behavior of marginal buyers or
sellers can generate large changes in the prices or quantities available to all
buyers and sellers.
Loren Brandt’s study of Yangzi rice markets nicely illustrates these ideas.
Despite the small volume of overseas rice trade, Brandt finds that by the end
of the nineteenth century, rice prices in interior markets, like Chongqing and
Changsha, were quickly affected by fluctuations in Asian grain markets.2®
This means that the daily lives of rice farmers, rice consumers, would-be rice
farmers, grain merchants and shippers, the families and suppliers of these
agents, their customers and suppliers, and others in interior regions, like
Sichuan and Hunan, were significantly affected by what seem at first glance
to be minor economic phenomena. Brandt’s study shows how actions in
apparently insignificant components of an economy can produce significant
reactions, even in distant places, through the medium of market forces.
Many people can verify this “principle” from their personal memories of the
oil crisis of the early 1970s, when rising energy costs affected travel habits,
auto designs, building codes, and so forth in the United States, Japan, and
even oil exporters, like Canada.
The economists’ campaign to win the minds, if not the hearts, of his
torians can probably not succeed merely by reciting economic principles as
abstractions or immutable laws. More persuasive, perhaps, is the reasoning
that is derived from economic theory. Economic theory can serve as a lever
for increasing the power of a given set of data and a tool for squeezing as
much meaning and implication from it as possible. For economists, economic
25. Thomas G. Rawski, “China’s Republican Economy: An Introduction” (Toronto, 1978),
pp. 2-5.
26. Loren Brandt, “Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 1870s-1930s: A
Reassessment,” Explorations in Economic History 22 (1985): 168—93.
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theory will suggest a story, or sequence of implications, about sets of initial
economic circumstances or facts. The predictions obtained from theoretical
reasoning can range from simple propositions about the impact on relative
prices of meat and fish of the Pope’s decision to end the Catholic tradition
of meatless Fridays to Karl Marx’s grand vision of capitalist decline. The
stories told by economic historians fall between these two extremes, typi
cally using short chains of reasoning based on economic concepts to obtain
predictions that can be tested with historical evidence.2’ Their method
involves selecting a model, or analytic framework, based on assumptions
that appear to fit the historical circumstances under investigation, studying
the logical implications of the model in search of testable conclusions, and
comparing these predictions, as well as the model’s assumptions, with con
crete evidence from historical sources.
Several examples can illustrate the value of theory-based analysis as a
source of hypotheses for the historian to investigate. Consider the case of
railway development, which, by reducing transport costs and transit time,
creates new opportunities for trade among cities and between town and
countryside. Construction of a new railway line should raise the price that
farmers receive for fruit crops, which now gain unprecedented access to
urban markets, and lower the cost to farmers of urban factory goods. Terms
of trade (price of interregional “exports” divided by price of imports) should
improve for both townspeople and farmers. But China’s new railways be
came the focus of military strife among competing political groups, bringing
death and destruction to hapless farmers caught between rival armies.
Lacking detailed information concerning changes in local production or
the damage inflicted by military operations, how can the historian begin
to determine the economic consequences of railway construction in rural
China? Here is where recourse to economic theory, with its capacity to
reveal causal links that may provide unexpected opportunities to examine
the consequences of historical events, begins to display its potential. The
concept of entry and exit immediately directs the researcher’s attention to
changes in population density and migration patterns as indicators of altered
patterns of economic opportunity in regions affected by railway develop
ment. The economic theory of rent implies that trends in land rents and land
prices can reveal whether, from the viewpoint of local farmers, the opportuni
ties created by railway development outweighed the damage caused by
periodic military incursions and, if so, by how much.2® Another perspective
27. Donald N. McCloskey, Econometric History (Houndsmills, Eng., 1987), chap. 2.
28. The idea of using trends in land values to appraise the impact of transport innovation
comes from Roger Ransom, “Social Returns from Public Transport Investment: A Case Study of
the Ohio Canal" Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970): 1041-60. For Chinese evidence, see
Ernest P. Liang, China: Railways and Agricultural Development, 1875-1935 (Chicago, 1982), pp.
141-44.
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on the consequences of railway expansion comes from Thomas R. Gottschang’s finding that the coming of the railway apparently slowed the pace of
out-migration from North China, despite reducing the cost of travel to and
from Manchuria. Apparently the increased opportunity arising from proxim
ity to rail transport outweighed the reduced cost of migration in the eyes of
farm families in Hebei and Shandong.^9
Further examples of how historians can benefit from thinking in terms of
economic theory arise from applying the concept of market integration, also
known as the law of one price, which postulates that the universal desire to
buy cheap and sell dear attracts buyers to low-price markets and sellers to
high-price outlets, thus squeezing interregional price differences toward the
minimum necessitated by the costs of shipping goods between separate mar
kets. Market integration is made possible by good and cheap transportation,
adequate information about costs, and efficient commercial institutions.
Consumers, as well as economists, like market integration because it gives
them access to a wide range of products at low prices. Producers value mar
ket integration because it expands the actual and potential market for their
goods. Historians should also be keenly interested in market integration not
simply for what markets show about links among various segments of the
economy but also because, as the work of Skinner copiously demonstrates,
analysis of marketing relationships may affect a host of political and social
factors ranging from taxation to marriage and even language.
Here again, a dose of theory can help the historian to leap over docu
mentary lacunae, as well as overcome skepticism about the heuristic value
of economic principles or assumptions. Did agricultural wages, produc
tivity, and incomes rise in China during the decades prior to World War II?
To answer this question, one would hope to find reliable information on
trends in agricultural production and farmers’ incomes. Unfortunately, the
information available to the researcher is both thin and of questionable valid
ity. Wage data for nonfarm occupations, however, are relatively abundant.
Can theory offer a useful link between agricultural circumstances and non
farm wages?
Unskilled workers in such nonfarm industries as cotton mills and coal
mines often came directly from rural villages. China’s cotton and coal mag
nates were profit-seeking entrepreneurs operating in fiercely competitive
markets that offered little chance to “pass along” rising costs in the form of
higher prices. They had every incentive to keep wages as low as possible.
Unless forced to raise wages by government fiat or union pressure, employers
sought to avoid raising wages except when it was necessary to assure an
29. Thomas R. Gottschang, “Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration; The Historical
Case of Manchuria,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 3 (1987): 461—90.
30. Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China,” in three parts, Journal ofAsian
Studies 24, no. 1 (1964): 3-43; 24, no. 2 (1965): 195-228; and 24, no. 3 (1965): 363-99.
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adequate work force. As long as rural labor incomes remain stable, mines
and mills can attract workers without raising wages. If rural incomes begin
to increase, mines and mills will find their labor supply drying up unless they
offer higher wages to village recruits. Under these circumstances, a pattern of
rising real wages for unskilled workers in China’s cotton and coal industries
can be taken as evidence of rising real incomes in the rural regions that
supplied miners and mill hands and also in more remote areas linked
through labor markets to the immediate supplying regions. Because inter
regional wage differentials induced large numbers of Chinese workers to
cross provincial and even international boundaries in pursuit of economic
opportunity, evidence of rising real wages for unskilled workers in the widely
dispersed cotton and coal industries furnishes strong support for the view
that the rising trend of labor income was national in scope.^'
Underlying this reasoning is the economists’ conception, or model, of how
markets, in this case labor markets, function. Textile mills or coal mines
located in city A customarily obtain unskilled workers (perhaps indirectly
through the agency of labor recruiters) from rural areas B and C. The mills
or mines pay wages that are higher than typical farm incomes. This premium
compensates workers for the cost of journeying to an unfamiliar locale,
separation from their families, and the risk of industrial accidents. If farm
incomes in B or C begin to rise, mill or mine wages will look less attractive
to potential recruits, who will become less willing to leave their villages.
The mill or mine owners (or labor recruiters) can look elsewhere for job
candidates or raise wages to encourage more volunteers from the customary
locations. If young villagers elsewhere are willing to move in response to
economic opportunity, nonfarm employers may prefer the cheap option
of seeking recruits from alternate rural locations D and E by offering the
standard wage. If the rise in farm incomes is a local phenomenon confined
to B and C, this approach will prove successful in damping upward pressure
on nonfarm wages for unskilled labor. If, on the other hand, farm incomes
are increasing across a wide range of localities from which mills and mines
might seek to recruit new workers, nonfarm employers will find themselves
unable to maintain an adequate work force without raising the wages offered
to unskilled recruits. If farm incomes—which provide the financial alterna
tive against which potential miners and textile workers measure the benefit of
leaving their home villages—continue to increase, wages paid by mines and
mills will rise too.
Thus, once it is assumed that labor markets function in the manner spec
ified, with employers seeking cheap labor supplies and villagers willing to
migrate in response to premium wages, the theory of market integration, here
31. Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989),
chap. 6.
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applied to the market for unskilled labor, encourages the historian to per
ceive the trend of unskilled workers’ earnings in coal mines and cotton mills
as a barometer of farm incomes, not only in the workers’ home villages but
also in other villages where mines and mills could easily have sought fresh
recruits. The link between farm and nonfarm wages is not automatic. Ap
plication of this reasoning requires the historian to determine that the wage
data pertain to occupations open to village recruits and to verify the histori
cal relevance of the behavior patterns postulated in the framework, or model,
outlined above. If these tasks can be accomplished, economic theory permits
the historian to construct a powerful and revealing analysis of phenomena
that are simply not amenable to study through conventional methods.
The theory of market integration can also help to estimate interest rates in
historical situations. Interest rates are of historical significance because they
are part of broader economic cycles, because they tell us something about
trends in the economy, and because they influence individual choices be
tween current and future consumption. Yet interest rates are difiicult for
historians to discern. Consequently Donald N. McCloskey and John Nash’s
suggestion that interest rates are inherent in the seasonal fluctuation of grain
prices is useful for Chinese historians, since the Chinese historical record
contains a great deal of detailed information about grain prices. Whoever
holds grain harvested in autumn for resale or consumption in the spring
sacrifices the use of the money that could be obtained by immediate sale of
the autumn harvest. Whoever loans money during the winter months makes
an identical sacrifice. In other words, the opportunity cost of holding grain is
the cash that could be obtained from autumn sales, plus whatever interest
could be earned by that cash over the winter. The law of one price, here
applied to the market for money, insists that, over a suitably long number of
years, the earnings from assigning funds to holding grain must match the
returns from assigning funds to holding debtors’ promissory notes. Thus,
McCloskey and Nash explain, interest rates, and the variation of interest
rates across time and space, can be calculated from the seasonal rise in grain
prices that begins with the annual post-harvest trough and ends at the sea
sonal preharvest peak.^^
To recognize the importance of market integration is one thing; to define
and measure it is another. As some of the essays in this volume show, even
with good price data, it may be difficult to discern whether and when true
market integration existed in history. Even in today’s world of data collection
and widespread information networks, economists still have difficulty estab
lishing what actually constitutes market integration.^3 In antitrust cases, the
32. Donald N. McCloskey and John Nash, “Corn at Interest: The Extent and Cost of Grain
Storage in Medieval England,” American Economic Review 74, no. 1 (1984): 174-87.
33. For one suggestion, see George J. Stigler and Robert A. Sherwin, “The Extent of the
Market,” Joama/ of Law and Economics 28 (1985): 555-85.
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appropriate definition of a market includes both the “product market” (i.e.,
whether the product has reasonable substitutes) and the geographic market.
When Mobil Corporation tried to acquire the Marathon Oil Company in
1981, Marathon brought an antitrust suit against Mobil. Mobil attempted to
demonstrate that the relevant market for oil was nationwide and that hence
the merger would have only a slight impact on prices. For Marathon, on the
other hand, the task was to demonstrate that the markets for oil were re
gional and that hence the merger was likely to have a great impact on prices.
Marathon won the case because, in the words of the court, “the persistence of
price differentials in various areas of the nation demonstrates that motor
gasoline does not move from area to area in response to price changes easily
or as readily as Mobil asserts. Rather, they indicate that the relevant geo
graphic market for motor gasoline is something less than nationwide.
Here the debate among lawyers and economists centered, not on the theo
retical importance of market integration, but on exactly how to define and
measure it.
ECONOMIC METHODS AND THE DATA PROBLEM

The second aspect of an economic perspective or approach involves method.
Methodology in economics can mean different things. Broadly defined, it can
mean a way of thinking or a general approach to hypothesis testing or prob
lem solving. More narrowly conceived, it can refer to particular statistical
techniques: the Gini coefficient, the Chow test, and so forth. Although eco
nomics often involves the use of numbers and quantification of some sort, its
approach is not absolutely dependent on quantification. At least two of the
articles in this volume (by Susan Mann and Emily Honig) involve little
quantitative data, and yet they fully reflect an economist’s way of thinking.
Historians of China may be discouraged from pursuing economic topics
because of the apparent lack of data. And yet there are, as we shall describe
later, many more data than meet the eye. Moreover, generations of historians
have contributed fruitfully to the analysis of economic trends in Europe and
North America without the benefit of careful compilation or systematic
analysis of quantitative data. A generation of new economic historians, focus
ing its attention on the economies of North America and Great Britain, has
demonstrated that better, fuller results and sounder interpretations are often
available when research using conventional documentary sources is com
bined with diligent mining of quantitative materials, which are always de
ficient in a variety of dimensions. Before succumbing to the defeatist view
34. F. M. Scherer, “Merger in the Petroleum Industry: The Mobil-Marathon Case (1981),”
in John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, eds.. The Antitrust Revolution (Glenview, 111.,
1989), p. 35.
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that certain data are uniquely defective, Chinese historians should consider
the implication of Nicholas Crafts’s new study claiming that the average
annual growth of British per capita income between 1801 and 1831 should be
reduced from the long-accepted Deane-Cole result of 1.6 percent to a much
lower figure of 0.5 percent, implying that per capita incomes rose by 16 per
cent rather than 61 percent during 1801—31.^® If British historians cannot yet
determine whether industry and commerce grew slower (Deane and Cole)
or faster (Crafts), or whether agriculture grew much faster (Deane and Cole)
or slower (Crafts) during 1760-80 than during 1700-60, perhaps their
data, which have supported hundreds of studies in what McCloskey calls
“econometric history” are no better than the Chinese historians’.
Historians are particularly concerned with detecting trends and cycles.
Contrary to the political scientists’ old adage “In China if something hap
pens twice, it’s a trend,” the identification of trends in economic history is
a bit more complicated. Was the economy growing or stagnating? Were in
comes rising or falling? Was land distribution becoming more equal or less
equal? Was the standard of living rising or falling? Not only is this the stuff
of which the truly important historical debates are made, but it should be
apparent that this is also the material of present-day debates among politi
cal candidates. These are questions of measurement that are at the heart
of economic methodology.
How economists can use incomplete and imperfect data in studying his
torical problems can perhaps be illustrated with an analysis of the fate of the
traditional Chinese junk trade in the Republican period. As railways and
steamships were introduced to the Chinese economy in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, it has often been assumed that they displaced
the traditional sailing vessels, or junks. But Thomas G. Rawski’s hypothesis
is that the junk trade not only survived the introduction of modern transport
but actually increased its volume at the same time that modern transport
grew.^® If he can prove his case, it would be extremely significant for evaluat
ing China’s prewar economy because it would show that the rapidly growing
freight carriage by railways and steamships represented trade creation—an
important sign of commercialization and economic expansion—and not trade
diversion—a mere substitution of new technology for old with no change in
cargo volume.
Economic theory links changes in production (in this case, of transport
services) to the level of capital formation (construction of new junks).
Wooden sailing vessels have long service lives. If we assume that participants
35. N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985),
as reviewed in the Journal of Economic Literature 24, no. 2 (1986): 683—84; and Phyllis Deane and
W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 (Cambridge, 1967).
36. Based on Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China, chap. 4.
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in the shipping and boat-building trades display the income-seeking be
havior that economists expect in any market economy (shippers do not aban
don useful vessels in the absence of significant technological change; ship
yards do not continue to operate if sales volume and price plummet), then we
must expect any decline in the volume of junk traffic to quickly erode the
demand for new ships. This is exactly what occurred on the Liao River in
Manchuria, where diversion of riverine traflSc to the railways prompted
observers to note that “there are no new ships built for the river and [the]
majority of the ships now being used are those constructed more than ten
years ago.”®^ Information about shipbuilding in the Yangzi Delta (including
Shanghai), however, shows that the industry continued to thrive despite un
restricted competition from new carriers. A 1941 survey at Suzhou found that
14 of 36 ships were less than ten years old.^® Another study lists over 20
places near Shanghai and along both banks of the Yangzi where shipyards
continued to operate even after 1940.3^
If evidence from shipbuilding data indicates that junk traffic did not de
cline prior to 1937, how can we investigate the stronger proposition that junk
shipping actually increased despite growing competition from steamships,
motor launches, railways, and trucks? Fortunately, we have some data show
ing that the junk trade expanded in several important ports and fared well in
competition with rail, steamship, and cart traffic in delivering cotton to the
major textile center of Tianjin. This information may be supplemented by a
series of calculations that estimate the volume of wheat arriving in Shanghai
by junk. Wheat was one of the most important commodities shipped into
Shanghai. Ifjunk-borne shipments of wheat increased along with the expan
sion of railway and steamship carriage, the overall argument about the sur
vival and growth of the junk trade is greatly strengthened.
Our estimate rests on an equation. The volume of wheat arriving by junk
was roughly equal to (1) the wheat required by Shanghai flour mills, minus
(2) the net import of wheat into Shanghai from abroad, minus (3) the net
inflow of domestic wheat carried by steamship, minus (4) the inflow of
domestic wheat into Shanghai by rail. Gathering together various pieces of
admittedly imperfect data, we reach the conclusion that junk-borne ship
ments of wheat into Shanghai may have risen from 139,000 tons in 1914 to an
average of 244,000 tons in the 1930s. But how can we defend our estimate in
the face of the known imperfections in the data we have used? The key is to
look very carefully at the assumptions employed in constructing the data
from which these results are derived. For example, there are several different
figures for overseas wheat imports (2) during 1931—33, the end point of our
37. The Manchuria Year Book 1932-33 (Tokyo, 1932), p. 284.
38. Chushi no minsengyo: Soshu minsen jittai chosa hokoku (Tokyo, 1943), 1:26-27.
39. Shina no koun (Tokyo, 1944), pp. 83-84.
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time series. Our calculations employ the largest of these figures, a tactic that
lowers the estimated junk inflow for 1931-33 and thus tends to undercut the
working hypothesis. Second, lacking data on railway shipments (4) in 1914,
the starting point of our time series, we assume the lowest possible figure—
none at all. This raises the estimated inflow of junk-borne wheat in 1914,
again in opposition to the proposed conclusion. Despite these two challenges,
the calculations are still able to show that junk-borne shipments of wheat
into Shanghai were substantially larger in 1931-33 than in 1914.
Historians unfamiliar with quantitative research may complain that this
type of scholarship is no more than a tissue of assumptions, with results
predetermined before pencil meets paper. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Assumptions are all laid out for the readers’ scrutiny and critical eval
uation, and precisely to show that they do not control the conclusions. In a
world of imperfect sources, the researcher must convince critical readers that
empirical results are strong enough to overcome possible defects in the
underlying data. The tactic of demonstrating an assertion to be valid even
under assumptions that stack the deck against the proposed conclusion is
commonly used in economics for precisely this purpose. Findings that can
survive the impact even of contrary assumptions are called robust. Robustness
is a characteristic eagerly sought by applied economists and carefully
weighed by readers who find themselves suspicious of published results. If
evidence favoring the proposed conclusion is so striking that it emerges even
from data that are skewed in ways that suppress the very trend the researcher
seeks to establish, even a skeptical audience should acquiesce.
In this way—as illustrated by the examples of using wage data to study
farm incomes, deriving interest rates from grain prices, and seeking infor
mation about junk traffic by investigating the fortunes of shipbuilders—
historians can use economic reasoning to assist them in separating historical
fact from fiction. Although it was generally said that steam and rail transport
displaced junk transport, economic theory led to the suspicion that this
might not actually have been the case, and application of economic methods
showed that it almost certainly was not the case.
Identifying trends can help economists and historians to distinguish how
people behave from what people say. If professors complain of low incomes,
we conclude that they desire higher salaries. It is only when significant
numbers of teachers leave academe that we can identify professional wages
as being too low in the equilibrium sense. Unlike intellectual historians,
who interest themselves in conscious ideas, or cultural or social historians,
who investigate attitudes and perceptions {mentalites) that are unconscious,
economists are skeptical about words and self-perception. Because ac
quiring information is costly in terms of both time and money, economists
believe that people tend to be well informed only about matters of direct im
portance to their livelihood and may not see the larger picture. Further-
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more, what people say and write about their economic circumstances is often
intended to change those circumstances and may not be a reliable guide to
the circumstances themselves.
But in focusing on broad trends, economists may overlook cyclical events
or regional variations that greatly affect the lives of those who experience
them and therefore offer important material for historical studies. Thus the
conclusion that junk trafiSc increased in China during the decades prior to
World War II submerges the reality of a regional decline in junk activity
along the Liao River. In a monumental and influential work on Chinese
agriculture from 1368 to 1968, the economist Dwight H. Perkins estimates
the expansion of agricultural output in this period on the basis of population
size.'*^ The key to his estimate was the assumption that everyone must have
eaten a minimum diet (or they would not have been alive).
The story of a rapidly expanding population sustained by six centuries of
increased agricultural productivity certainly paints a rosy picture of the
Chinese economy and implies that everyone had at least a subsistence diet,
contrary to a gloomy Malthusian picture that might otherwise be imagined.
But in fact Perkins’s calculations say only that on the whole people must have
had enough to eat. His equation does not take into account those who may
have died from undernutrition, nor does it consider patterns of regional de
velopment and decline or the possibility of extreme inequality of income and
welfare. Economists seeking to define long-term trends in average income or
consumption may not notice that a minority may have eaten, and lived, ex
ceedingly well, while a larger group may have suffered from inadequate diets
(since on the whole, or on average, people had enough to eat). As a result, the
measurement of macroeconomic trends, while offering valuable information
to historians, leaves much important work to be done in terms of investi
gating the distribution of gains and losses among regions, groups, and
individuals.^*
ECONOMISTS AND HISTORIANS NEED EACH OTHER

Our message, then, is not that the economic approach to historical research
overshadows other types of inquiry or that economics is a panacea for schol
arly problems. Indeed, the economic approach tends to have its own limita
tions, such as taking the whole to be the same as the sum of the parts or
underrating the importance of noneconomic causation in history. Economists
need to take historical realities into account. But historians need to adopt an
40. Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (Chicago, 1969).
41. This perception is shared by economists who report that “rapid growth in underde
veloped countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of the population.” See Hollis
Chenery, “Introduction,” in Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (London, 1974), p. xiii.
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economic perspective, particularly when writing about the economy. We
contend that history written without the insights that emerge from systemati
cally applying economic theory and method will be incomplete and impover
ished. If historians are willing to suspend a certain disbelief about the econ
omists’ principles and assumptions, systematic application of theory and
methods may produce insights and results that will weaken the initial dis
belief The knowledge required for historians to make use of the economic
approach is neither remote nor inaccessible. The successful completion of
this volume demonstrates that a brief period of intensive preparation will
enable historical researchers without extensive economic training to fruitfully
apply the insights of economic analysis with results that will appeal to
economists as well as historians. This volume stands as the proof of this
assertion, and we now turn to a survey of its contents.
CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME

The essays in this volume fall into two groups. The first group relies primar
ily on grain price data from the Qing dynasty to establish long-term trends in
the Chinese economy, analyze the nature of market integration, and deline
ate the role of the Qing state. They could be described as studies of price
behavior. The second group of papers focuses on the study of land, labor, and
capital in more localized situations in the twentieth century. Narrower in
focus and more recent in time, these papers center on the issue of market
response. In different ways, these papers illustrate some of the general ideas
about economic perspective and approach discussed above and point to
further opportunities for work in Chinese economic history.
The essays on Qing price history make use of grain price data from the
Qing period compiled from the holdings of the First Historical Archives in
Beijing and the National Palace Museum in Taibei. These data form what is
perhaps the richest, longest, and most detailed price series for the history of
any national economy. Starting formally from the beginning of the Qianlong
period in 1736, each governor was required to submit a monthly report of
grain prices in his province. This included the high and low price of each
major grain grown in each prefecture. This monthly provincial report was
compiled from ten-day reports submitted by each prefecture (/m), which in
turn had collected ten-day reports from each county [xian). Thus the high
and low prices noted in the prefectural reports represent the highest and
lowest prices reported by any county within a given prefecture during that
month. The number of grains for which prices were collected varied with
each province. In the South, as many as five or more different grades of rice
were included. In North China, five to seven grains were reported, including
wheat, millet, and sorghum.
Although the analysis of these grain price data has just begun, even the
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preliminary results have great importance for Chinese historical studies. The
records of grain price behavior permit us to establish basic long-term trends
in China’s historical economy, as well as to identify some shorter-term cycles.
Grain was the single most important commodity in the agrarian economy of
imperial China and the best indicator of economic trends. Yeh-chien Wang’s
article, “Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1638-1935,”
delineates two long-term cycles in that key region of China; a steep down
trend from the 1640s to the early 1680s followed by over a century of gen
erally rising prices; and a second cycle of price declines followed by steep
inflation from the 1880s until the world depression of the 1930s.
Lillian M. Li’s paper, “Grain Prices in Zhili Province, 1736-1911: A Pre
liminary Study,” shows broadly similar patterns for wheat, millet, and
sorghum prices in North China, with a peak in the 1820s and another
steady climb starting in the 1890s. Li’s data suggest the presence of distinct
short-term cycles of perhaps four- or five-year intervals for coarse grains
in the eighteenth century, and possibly longer cycles for wheat prices. She
also finds considerable price fluctuation in the late nineteenth century, before
the steady upward climb of the early twentieth century.
Much more work remains to be done to determine whether Wang was
correct in his earlier, pioneering work when he concluded that North and
South China grain prices in the Qing moved essentially in a synchronic man
ner, thus contradicting Skinner’s hypothesis of asynchronic regional cycles
and also implying considerable interregional market integration as early as
the eighteenth century. Also on the agenda is work that will connect the
analysis of Qing grain prices with the work of Brandt, who dates China’s
integration with the international rice market from the late nineteenth
century .^^2
Grain prices can provide insight into the functioning of markets. In par
ticular, price data can illuminate the extent of market integration within, as
well as among, regions. Peter C. Perdue’s essay, “The Qing State and the
Gansu Grain Market, 1739-1864,” reveals that even the remote Northwest
of China had achieved a considerable degree of market integration, primarily
through strong state intervention. Because of the strategic importance of the
Northwest, the Qing court maintained a heavy military presence there and,
to support it, a granary system that kept relatively high per capita levels of
grain reserves. Perdue believes that, in conjunction with private storage and
commerce, public grain storage worked to support the integration of key
markets of Gansu with each other and with neighboring Ningxia Province.
42. Yeh-chien Wang, “Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Grain Prices in China, 1740-1910”
(Paper presented at the Conference on Spatial and Temporal Trends and Cycles in Chinese
Economic History, Bellagio, Italy, 1984); G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The
Structure of Chinese History,”yoama/ ofAsian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985): 271—92; Brandt, “Chinese
Agriculture and the International Economy.”
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Although Perdue’s conclusions must be described as tentative because his
data series are far from complete, his Gansu data present a strong case for
market integration even in relatively remote areas of China.
In “Grain Markets and Food Supplies in Eighteenth-Century Hunan,”
R. Bin Wong and Peter C. Perdue further pursue the issue of market inte
gration, this time within Hunan Province, a major rice-exporting region in
central China. Since the general outline and functioning of the Hunan grain
markets is relatively well documented, Wong and Perdue utilize the grain
price data to test whether high levels of integration actually existed among
those prefectures known to be heavily engaged in the rice export trade. They
find that separate analyses of high prices and low prices each tend to confirm
integration among the exporting prefectures and lack of integration between
them and the nonexporting prefectures. They also see in the separate report
ing of high and low prices an opportunity to test for integration within each
prefecture, since the high and low prices reported for any month from each
prefecture presumably represent price quotations from two different counties
within the prefecture. They find that, with one exception, exporting prefec
tures had high levels of internal integration. Intraprefectural integration
was also high in relatively isolated prefectures. In short, Wong and Perdue’s
findings are reassuring because the “price data generally confirm the outlines
of the export trade based on qualitative information.”
Because there is a considerable amount of qualitative information about
Hunan’s rice trade, one may conclude with some degree of confidence that
high correlations of prices or price differences (the difference between the
price in the current period and the price in the previous period) do represent
market integration. Without confirmation of trading patterns, the occurrence
of high price correlations might arise from common climatic patterns or
changes in the stock of money rather than from market integration. In the
case of Gansu, for example, it might be argued that the strong military pres
ence in the province produced a type of integration of prices based, not on
true markets, but rather on a large measure of government intervention.
Perhaps this could be seen as a kind of false or pseudo market integration,
which is not to deny its historical significance. The same hypothesis could be
advanced with respect to grain markets in Zhili, where the presence of the
Imperial court, bannermen, and the military was so pervasive.
We can also use grain prices to examine the short-term fluctuations in
periods of crises. Li, in her article on Zhili, uses grain prices to test the im
pact of crises in several difierent ways. Like Perdue, she uses regression
analysis to try to measure the relative impact on prices of the passage of
time, seasonality, and natural catastrophes. Overall, she finds that flood or
drought did afiect prices, as one would expect. But the differences between
the price levels in normal years and those observed under crisis conditions
were rather slight in comparison to the differences recorded during crises in

n-
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seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Most likely, the operation of the
government granary system helped to stabilize prices and avert catastrophes,
as well as to provide relief during the crises themselves.
The topic of government grain storage raises a number of theoretical as
well as historical problems. Recent scholarship on the Qing granary system
has excited considerable interest. In fact, some of our contributors have com
pleted a book describing the state granaries and offering important data on
their management and holdings.^^ For Chinese historians, the state’s major
role in grain storage comes as no surprise, although the extent and efficiency
of the Qing granary system is quite remarkable. For non-China economists
and many historians, however, the notion of public storage requires consid
erable explanation. Economists, working from the principle of opportunity
cost, will immediately question whether government effort had any signif
icant effect on market circumstances. Private citizens store grain because
they hope to profit from the regular differential between low autumn and high
springtime grain prices and also from high prices that occur in the wake of
disasters, such as flood, drought, and war. Government storage efforts in
tended to limit seasonal price fluctuations and to curtail irregular price peaks
will reduce the profitability of private grain storage and lower the risk to
private citizens of not holding grain stocks. Thus, economists will reason,
public storage encourages a reduction of private storage, creating the possi
bility that energetic official intervention may have no significant effect on the
total quantity of grain stored, seasonal price fluctuations, or the price con
sequences of periodic natural or manmade disasters.
Of course the Chinese historians have a response to the economists’ skep
ticism. The economists’ assumption that private and public grain storage are
substitutes for each other is based on the premise that the private sector has
the capacity to store grain as conveniently as the government. In fact, the
forthcoming granary volume will show that in per capita terms, the granary
stocks were highest in China’s most remote and least commercialized prov
inces. The government, in short, appears to have intervened precisely where
the private sector was least able to ensure market stability. Put another way,
the government was subsidizing the storage of grain. In highly commercial
ized regions, such as the Lower Yangzi area, with its dense network of mar
kets and transport arteries and extensive private commerce, the government
could and did leave the job to private efforts and to the market. Larger public
storage programs might merely have replaced private efforts rather than
compressing the amplitude of fluctuations. The topic of grain storage thus
illustrates the economic sophistication of Qing officials. It also provides a
43. Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System
in China, 1650-1850 (Ann Arbor, 1991). James Lee, Jean Oi, and Peter Perdue also contributed to
this book.
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fruitful example of how the economists’ approach to a problem may help to
structure historical inquiry and how, conversely, understanding the histori
cal context helps to modify the predictions of economic theories. Although
much work has already been done on granaries, the availability of price data
now creates an opportunity to combine economic analysis and documentary
research to test and measure the impact of Qing grain storage efforts on the
economy.
Another theoretical problem raised by the grain price data, also illus
trated in Li’s article, is that of how to define and identify markets. Do wheat,
millet, and sorghum in North China belong to the same market, or do they
constitute separate markets? The principle of substitution teaches that a rise
in the relative price of wheat or any other commodity will increase the de
mand for, and hence the price of, items that provide close substitutes for the
initial product as buyers seek to maintain their living standards or contain
costs in the face of adverse price change. The question here is to what extent
people were willing to substitute one grain for another or, elsewhere, one type
of cloth for another. Such questions bear closely on the question of market
integration and call for further inquiry.
While the articles of Li, Perdue, and Wong and Perdue deal only with
grain prices, the articles of Yeh-chien Wang and James Lee, Cameron
Campbell, and Guofu Tan show how price data can be used in conjunction
with other long-term data. In his article, Wang arrays his rice price data
from the Lower Yangzi region together with population data, information
about silver stocks, and weather trends, to consider what factors may have
influenced long-term cycles of inflation and deflation in the Yangzi Delta.
Wang’s preliminary, and pathbreaking, estimates of China’s monetary silver
stocks indicate a roughly parallel growth of rice prices and the stock of
monetary silver throughout the Qing period. He finds that in China, as in
England, long-term trends in food prices display a substantial correlation
with changes in population and population growth. Wang describes two long
swings in rice prices during the three centuries prior to World War II. In
both cases, periods of rising prices coincide with relatively rapid growth of
both population and monetary silver, while interludes of deflation are asso
ciated with stagnant or declining population. Wang’s discussion highlights
opportunities for further study of major factors underlying the long-term
path of China’s economy. Can we sharpen the causal interrelations among
population, money stock, commercialization, climatic change, food produc
tion, and the material well-being of the Chinese peasantry? Do available
studies understate the long-term significance of international money flows for
China’s agrarian economy? How closely were the rice markets of the Yangzi
Delta linked to the farm economies of other regions within China’s vast land
mass?
In “Infanticide and Family Planning in Late Imperial China: The Price
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and Population History of Rural Liaoning, 1774—1873,” James Lee, Cam
eron Campbell, and Guofu Tan employ price data to help analyze a unique
and rich set of Qing dynasty population registers from Daoyi, a rural suburb of
present-day Shenyang in Liaoning (formerly Fengtian) Province in south
ern Manchuria. Their major demographic findings are, first, that signifi
cantly higher levels of infant mortality were found among females than among
males, although there were greater fluctuations in mortality among males;
second, that most couples appear to have practiced a considerable degree of
family planning; and, third, that infanticide, particularly female infanticide,
was a principal means of family planning. In this article, the authors pose the
question of how food prices might have influenced birth and death rates. In
other words, were fertility or mortality affected by times of scarcity, as indi
cated by high food prices? Their answer is that there seems, on the whole, to
have been little relationship between food prices and mortality, but there was
a strong relationship between high food prices and infanticides, particularly,
but not exclusively, female infanticides. While these conclusions are likely to
be hotly debated, in part because it is unclear whether Liaoning or Manchu
rian family patterns are generalizable to the rest of China, Lee, Campbell,
and Tan have pointed toward a direction in research that has not previously
been pursued in Chinese history.
The second group of essays in this volume focuses on issues more familiar
to modern Chinese history—urban and rural poverty, the economic con
sequences of political unrest, and economic growth or the lack of it. In deal
ing with the factors of land, labor, and capital in local or regional settings,
these essays pursue large issues in a more focused, and perhaps more man
ageable, way than the first set of articles. In each case, we see the interplay
between economic analysis and historical inquiry. Economic models open
new avenues of inquiry for historians, while the historical context illuminates
the social and institutional conditions that shape the impact of economic
forces in particular times and places.
In the first of these essays, “Land Concentration and Income Distribution
in Republican China,” Loren Brandt and Barbara Sands—the only econo
mists among our contributors—address the issue of land concentration and
income distribution in twentieth-century China. They challenge the com
monly held view that there was increasing concentration of land ownership
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that concentration of
landed wealth necessarily produced wide inequalities in the distribution of
income. Although the data from the 1920s and 1930s show a highly unequal
distribution of land, Brandt and Sands show that shifting the statistical base
from landholding per household into per capita terms narrows the gap be
tween poor and wealthy households. They argue that without comparable
data for earlier periods, there is no basis for claiming that the degree of con
centration of land ownership was rising over time.
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Their key point, however, is that in the complex economy of North China,
the distribution of per capita income depended on earnings from the dis
position of labor and goods as well as land, so that the concentration of landholdings need not have coincided with the concentration of incomes. If,
as hypothesized by Peter H. Lindert, “the common folk,” who specialized in
producing and selling goods that embodied large components of unskilled
labor, “were among the greatest gainers” from the expansion of China’s
domestic and international trade, the spread of commercial agriculture fol
lowing the growth of trade and transport may emerge as a significant source
of reduced income inequality in the North China countryside.'*^'*
Although Brandt and Sands analyze three villages selected for their
distinct economic characteristics, skeptics will note the small size of their
sample and the possible biases inherent in their principal source, the South
Manchurian Railway Company village surveys, which form the basis for a
number of controversial studies of peasant welfare in North China.^^ For our
purposes, however, of greater interest than the ultimate correctness of their
interpretation is the economic approach or perspective that they have em
ployed. By posing a theoretical issue, then isolating a number of key vari
ables and finding an appropriate set of data, the authors create a framework
for systematic analysis of the issue at hand. Finally, by placing the Chinese
issue in comparative, international terms, the authors provide a baseline or
context within which to judge the issue of large or small. At what point
should income inequality be considered large? Too large? Such judgments
require not only quantification but also appropriate context.
Lynda S. Bell approaches the issue of rural income from another perspec
tive: she looks at the silk industry in Wuxi, an area in the Lower Yangzi
region that developed into a major sericultural and silk-reeling center in the
nineteenth century after the Taiping Rebellion. In “Farming, Sericulture,
and Peasant Rationality in Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth Century,”
Bell explores an apparent paradox: why, in one of the more prosperous re
gions of China, did peasants in the 1920s and 1930s experience low incomes
from sericultural activity? And why should peasants continue to pursue seri
culture even though, as she effectively demonstrates, the returns per unit of
labor were lower for mulberry cultivation and silkworm raising than for rice
or wheat farming? Does this mean that farm households were not acting
rationally or that they were engaged in a kind of “self-exploitation” in the
manner described by A. V. Chayanov for the Russian peasantry? The key to
this paradox. Bell finds, is that women supplied most of the labor in seri44. Peter H. Lindert, “International Economics and the Historian” (Revision of a paper
prepared for the Workshop on Economic Methods for Chinese Historical Research, Honolulu,
September 1987), p. 30.
45. Myers, Chinese Peasant Economy, and Philip C. C. Huang, Peasant Economy, also rely on
these surveys.
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culture. Compared to other domestic industries they could engage in, such
as cotton weaving, sericulture brought superior returns. Only factory work
could have brought higher wages to women, but the opportunity cost—in
terms of domestic labor lost to the family if the woman left for a factory—
outweighed the extra income that might have been earned. Moreover, Bell’s
calculations reveal that even at the depressed silk prices of the 1930s, income
from sericulture allowed Wuxi farm households to buy more rice than they
could have grown on the land occupied by mulberry plants. So Bell finds
peasant choices ultimately to be rational, but cautions that rationality need
not imply that they were earning large profits; rather, rationality was what
kept them going in an economy in which subsistence, rather than profit, was
still the major preoccupation. Participation in an international market pre
sented new opportunities, but Wuxi peasants found that it also presented
new risks.
While the economic value of female labor implicitly figures in Bell’s
article, it is the main topic of Susan Mann’s essay, “Women’s Work in the
Ningbo Area, 1900—1936.” Using rich qualitative materials from a relatively
commercialized region of China, Mann delineates the factors that afiected
both the demand for, and the supply of, female labor. On the demand side,
she shows that there were many opportunities for female workers both within
and outside the household in the Ningbo area and that the hierarchy ofjobs,
from the women’s perspective, was less related to wage levels than to the
perceptions of social respectability and the degree of personal convenience
associated with each type of work. On the supply side, the availability of
female labor from each household was dependent on three major factors: its
size, its other resource endowments (these two were, of course, closely re
lated), and its stage in the family cycle. Families with adult women who had
no child-care responsibilities (young women before marriage or “able-bodied
widows”) were most likely to have labor to spare and therefore to benefit
from new opportunities for female employment within the household. Fac
tory employment, which violated social conventions that restricted respect
able women to working within the household, was acceptable only to women
from “poor households strategizing to keep their menfolk afloat.”
In “Native-Place Hierarchy and Labor Market Segmentation: The Case
of Subei People in Shanghai,” Emily Honig addresses an apparent puzzle:
why were people from Subei, the area of Jiangsu Province north of the
Yangzi River and south of the Huai River, routinely barred from certain types
of employment in Shanghai, even when they would have worked for lower
wages than employers paid to natives of south Jiangsu? Regarded as inferior
human beings, the Subei people in Shanghai were condemned to the least
attractive and least remunerative forms of employment—rickshaw pulling,
night soil and garbage collecting (literally, as she says, “shit work”), barbering, and so forth—within a clear hierarchy of jobs. Honig employs the
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economists’ concept of segmented labor markets to show that in Shanghai,
it was not race, religion, or ethnicity that formed a barrier to free entry and
exit, but native-place hierarchy.
Both Mann’s and Honig’s articles show that the economists’ notion of
choice has to be tempered by the social historians’ understanding of gender,
class, and native-place ties. Despite the heuristic value of the economists’
notion of ceteris paribus, historians find that all other things are rarely equal
and in fact it is the “other things” that may hold the key to understanding the
flow of events. Still, the approach of these two papers is entirely consistent
with an economic perspective. To start with the assumption that there
should be a unified labor market with no barriers to exit or entry and with
essentially one wage scale is not wrong; what would be wrong is to stop there.
Looked at from the employers’ perspective, labor market segmentation rests
on their need to assess the qualifications and character of would-be em
ployees or associates. With no access to data banks or credit histories, they
must seek a quick and inexpensive screening device. Discrimination on the
basis of ethnicity, place of origin, linguistic background, or education, can be
partly understood simply as a cost- and risk-reducing business decision.
Susan Mann’s Ningbo women benefited from their reputation for dili
gence, skill, and gentility. Employers preferred workers from Ningbo and
other south Jiangsu communities over migrants from the north not only be
cause of their superior technical and social skills but also because kinship ties
and networks of regional association were available for disciplining and con
trolling south Jiangsu workers, making it more profitable to hire them, even
when they might require higher pay than northerners. By the same token,
Subei natives were discriminated against. Businessmen preferred to deal
with those whose background seemed to increase the likelihood of the suc
cessful fulfillment of agreements. When disputes arise, the existence of volun
tary organizations, such as native-place associations (huiguan), increases the
probability of speedy resolution of conflict by informal procedures acceptable
to all parties. Drawing on the economic theory of clubs, Janet T. Landa has
proposed just such an explanation for the tendency of Chinese businessmen
in Southeast Asia to deal preferentially with Chinese whose ancestors mi
grated from the same district or province, secondarily with other Chinese,
and only if other contacts are not available, with local non-Chinese or with
foreign business partners.^®
Finally, Kenneth Pomeranz’s article, “Local Interest Story: Political
Power and Regional Differences in the Shandong Capital Market, 1900—
46. Janet T. Landa, “The Political Economy of the Ethnically Homogeneous Chinese Mid
dleman Group in Southeast Asia: Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship in a Plural Society,” in The
Chinese in Southeast Asia, vol. 1, ed. Linda Y. C. Lim and Peter L. A. Gosling (Singapore, 1983),
pp. 86—116.
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1937,” illustrates how political structures can decisively influence the out
come of economic change. During the early twentieth century, Shandong
Province experienced an expansion of markets and commerce similar to that
in the Wuxi region of Jiangsu Province in an earlier period. As in Jiangsu,
Shandong villagers were quick to avail themselves of new economic opportu
nities, specializing in peanuts and other cash crops in some regions and, as
Pomeranz documents, exporting large quantities of underpriced copper coins
whenever it became possible to do so.
Shandong’s political elite found themselves torn between the gains avail
able from encouraging economic integration and the benefits for themselves
and their mercantile allies of using military force to obstruct integration and
then exploit the resulting regional price gaps for pecuniary gain. With lead
ers in different regions responding differently to market circumstances, Shan
dong’s economy displayed lines of demarcation that reflected the impact of
political decisions more than economic, social, or geographic forces. Despite
a national trend toward economic integration, the needs of state making dur
ing this turbulent period of Shandong’s history prompted local authorities to
restrict the movement of specie across administrative boundaries, leading to
marked regional variations in both the silver-copper ratio and local interest
rates that illustrate a real political constraint on the spread of purely market
forces.
CONCLUSION
The essays in this volume do not fall into any single neat line of interpreta
tion about the economic history of China over the last two or three centuries.
Pomeranz’s detailed work on Shandong cautions us against any broad gener
alizations about the extent to which the treaty ports in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century China affected the hinterland economy. Pomeranz shows
us that the more advanced, coastal area did interact with the hinterland but
that political intervention prevented a higher degree of market integration.
The works of Bell, Mann, and Honig also contain a cautionary message.
Even in the Lower Yangzi macroregion, the most agriculturally prosperous
and commercially advanced area of China, the opportunities for economic
gain for individual peasants or workers, although often greater than ever
before, could be undercut by international economic instability, gender dif
ferences in the returns to labor, and unequal access to the urban labor mar
ket. The story that Brandt and Sands tell, however, contains the reverse
message. In the much more adverse conditions of North China, all may not
have been so bad as it appeared. New employment opportunities provided
more channels for a family’s economic gain than just landholding. Entry to
and exit from these lines of work appear unimpeded in the North China
world they describe.

INTRODUCTION

31

The lessons of the articles in Part 1 are somewhat different. In some cases,
the findings of these grain price studies confirm previously known trends or
previously advanced hypotheses. For example, Wong and Perdue’s study of
Hunan’s grain price series confirms commercial patterns already discerned
through qualitative sources. Li’s case studies of crises parallel the results of
Pierre-Etienne Will’s documentary study. Perdue’s delineation of marketing
patterns in Gansu coincides with G. William Skinner’s predictions about the
spatial patterns of Gansu’s commodity trade. In other cases, such as Wang’s
study of money supply or Lee, Campbell, and Tan’s study of Liaoning, new
materials have generated new hypotheses about long-term trends.
These essays also contain the potential for even bolder messages, perhaps
revisions of current received wisdom, about China’s economic history over
the last two or three centuries. Some readers may derive from the essays in
Part 1 a picture of the eighteenth-century economy as more advanced in
commercial development and market integration than previously thought.
Certainly, the quality of the Qing bureaucracy’s price data seems higher
than that of its population records, the systematic fabrication of which
Skinner has recently exposed.Wang’s compilation of information on stocks
of monetary silver creates an opportunity for using the equation of exchange
to investigate the implications of Dwight Perkins’s long-standing assertion
that, on the average, Chinese living standards, as measured by the availabil
ity of grain, experienced no long-term upward or downward trend during the
Ming and Qing dynasties.The essays in Part 2 all illustrate, in varying
ways, the extent to which commercialization, including the development of
foreign as well as domestic trade, penetrated the local economies of many
areas. The story of expanding commercial networks finds a basis in these
papers, but there are other stories that have been, and will be, told about the
modern economy.
Despite the many insights and contributions contained in the essays that
follow, we believe, however, that the real lessons of this volume are not the
substantive ones. In each case, economic theories and methods have been
employed to clarify the facts of history and to advance its understanding.
47. G. William Skinner, “Sichuan’s Population in the Nineteenth Century: Lessons from
Disaggregated Data,” Late Imperial China 8, no. 1 (1987): 69.
48. If we assume parallel growth between silver stocks and money supply, between grain
prices and the general price level, and between foodgrain production and total output, the
equation of exchange can be used to derive the time path for income velocity of monetary
circulation implied by Wang’s data on silver, grain prices, and population together with Per
kins’s hypothesis of stable per capita output. The plausibility of the resulting velocity estimates
and of changes that might arise from adjustments reflecting known biases in the underlying data
(we know, for example, that money supply grew faster than silver stocks in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries) should make it possible to evaluate the degree to which Perkins’s
results, the grain price data, and Wang’s new monetary estimates provide a mutually consistent
picture of overall economic trends.
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Without a fundamental understanding of the laws of supply and demand and
the significance of market integration, none of the essays in Part 1 could have
been written. Without an appreciation of how factor markets operate, the
essays in Part 2 would have been greatly weakened. Wang’s article provides
an excellent example of how economic theory, in this case the quantity theory
of money, can inform both the construction and interpretation of economic
data to help formulate new questions and hypotheses.
In many of the essays, however, a simple economic approach in itself
would lead to an impasse or a seeming contradiction. These apparent puz
zles, such as Shandong’s lack of monetary integration or Wuxi’s apparent
poverty in one of China’s most prosperous regions, can only be explained
with reference to the institutional and social context that historians are
uniquely qualified to understand and explain. Without knowledge of the
social prejudices attached to Subei people, their lowly position in Shang
hai’s labor force would defy understanding. Without knowing the history of
the Chinese bureaucracy and the fundamentals of Confucian political theory.
Western-trained economists find it difficult to comprehend why the Chinese
state should have maintained a vast civilian granary system in the Qing
period. Often the results of economic analysis raise questions that compel us
to further noneconomic inquiry. The surprising demographic behavior of the
Han Banner population of Liaoning causes us to want to know more about
their ethnic background, their family structure, and their food allocation
habits and in particular to understand whether they were very different from
Han Chinese who lived within the Great Wall. In short, economic analysis
cannot stand alone and, in almost every case, offers rich opportunities for
work with other disciplines—sociology, anthropology, politics, and history.
Chinese economic history is barely coming into its own as a field of study.
What this volume is intended to show, to its authors as well as to our col
leagues and students, is that further study of China s economic history that
systematically utilizes the theories and methods of economics can generate
new hypotheses and fresh perspectives that will enrich the study of all aspects
of China’s history as well as deepen our understanding of the structure and
evolution of the Chinese economy itself.

